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Framing and free riding: emotional responses and punishment in social dilemma games

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Abstract

In this paper, we report an experimental investigation of the effect of framing on social preferences, as revealed in a one-shot linear public goods game. We use two types of indicator to measure social preferences: self-reported emotional responses; and, as a behavioural indicator of disapproval, punishment. Our findings are that, for a given pattern of contributions, neither type of indicator depends on the Give versus Take framing that we manipulate. To this extent, they suggest that the social preferences we observe are robust to framing effects.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Economics, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, Sir Clive Granger Building, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK

    Robin P. Cubitt & Simon Gächter

  2. Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK

    Michalis Drouvelis

  3. CESifo, Munich, Germany

    Simon Gächter

  4. IZA, Bonn, Germany

    Simon Gächter

Authors
  1. Robin P. Cubitt
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  2. Michalis Drouvelis
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  3. Simon Gächter
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Correspondence to Robin P. Cubitt.

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Cubitt, R.P., Drouvelis, M. & Gächter, S. Framing and free riding: emotional responses and punishment in social dilemma games. Exp Econ 14, 254–272 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-010-9266-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-010-9266-0

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