A comparison between the development of the appearance-reality distinction in the People's Republic of China and the United States☆
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Development of the appearance-reality distinction
Cognitive Psychology
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Cited by (42)
Theory of mind and executive function in early childhood: A cross-cultural investigation
2022, Cognitive DevelopmentCitation Excerpt :Nativist, modular theories claim that ToM is an innate, universal human capacity (e.g., Fodor, 1992; Scholl & Leslie 2001). Early studies of East Asian samples also supported the universality of ToM (Flavell, Zhang, Zou, Dong, & Qi, 1983; Gardner et al., 1988; Lee, Olson, & Torrance, 1999). However, other studies have reported up to a 2-year delay in success on false belief tasks in children in different countries (for meta-analytic reviews, see Liu, Wellman, Tardif, & Sabbagh, 2008; Wellman et al., 2001), challenging the idea that ToM emerges in the same way across cultures, and therefore proposing culture-specific accounts of ToM (e.g., Nelson, 2004; Astington, 2003; Happé, Cook, & Bird, 2017).
Appearance questions can be misleading: A discourse-based account of the appearance-reality problem
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2022, The Crosslinguistic Study of Language Acquisition: Volume 3Perspective-taking across cultures: Shared biases in Taiwanese and British adults
2019, Royal Society Open Science
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This research was supported in part by the government of the People's Republic of China, the Foundation for Child Development, and NICHD Grant HD 09814.