Fairness and preference

doi:10.1016/0022-1031(79)90047-7

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

Volume 15, Issue 4, July 1979, Pages 418-434

https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(79)90047-7 Get rights and content

Abstract

Two equity models were evaluated by fitting them to subjects' judgments of the fairness of payment distributions to “self” and “other” under hypothetical work situations. Neither the E. Walster, G. W. Walster, and E. Berscheid (Equity: Theory and Research, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1978) equity formulation nor Harris' (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1976, 12, 194–209) linear model adequately accounted for the fairness judgments regardless of whether self worked more or less than other. Subjects also were asked to indicate their most preferred payment distributions and these preferences were significantly different from the fairness judgments. Results suggested that fairness judgments were influenced by a bias in the direction of overpayment to self.

References (7)

R.J. Harris
Handling negative inputs: On the plausible equity formulae
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
(1976)
J.S. Adams
Inequity in social exchange
N.H. Anderson
Cognitive Algebra

There are more references available in the full text version of this article.

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^☆: This research was supported in part by grants to David Messick from the National Science Foundation, GS-3061, and the University of California, Santa Barbara, Committee on Research.

¹: Keith Sentis is now at the Research Center for Group Dynamics, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48106.

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Fairness and preference☆

Abstract

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

Inequity in social exchange

Cognitive Algebra