An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining

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Abstract

There are many experimental studies of bargaining behavior, but suprisingly enough nearly no attempt has been made to investigate the so-called ultimatum bargaining behavior experimentally. The special property of ultimatum bargaining games is that on every stage of the bargaining process only one player has to decide and that before the last stage the set of outcomes is already restricted to only two results. To make the ultimatum aspect obvious we concentrated on situations with two players and two stages. In the ‘easy games’ a given amount c has to be distributed among the two players, whereas in the ‘complicated games’ the players have to allocate a bundle of black and white chips with different values for both players. We performed two main experiments for easy games as well as for complicated games. By a special experiment it was investigated how the demands of subjects as player 1 are related to their acceptance decisions as player 2.

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The authors would like to thank Reinhard Selten (University of Bielefeld) and two anonymous referees for their valuable advice.

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