The neural basis of agency: An fMRI study
Introduction
Agency refers to the feeling, “I am the one causing or controlling a movement” (Gallagher, 2000). Defined as such, agency tells us whether an action is caused by ourselves or by other agents, and it plays an important role in self-consciousness (Newen and Vogeley, 2003).
To explain the mechanism of agency formation, several models have recently been proposed in the field of neuroscience, arising particularly from the observation of pathological agency states, in which patients claim that they have no feeling of control over their actions and feel as if their bodies are moving by their own agency or being controlled by other agents, such as anarchic hand syndrome or schizophrenic patients’ delusions of control (Biran et al., 2006, Asai et al., 2008). According to such proposed models, when we perform an action, our brain predicts the sensory consequences of that action as an assortment of multimodal sensory feedback, exemplified by visuo-proprioceptive association, and compares this prediction with actual sensory feedback (see Wolpert et al., 1995, Wolpert, 1997, Frith et al., 2000, Blakemore et al., 2002 for a review). If these match, then the action is judged as self-induced, giving rise to a sense of agency. On the other hand, if discrepancies between these emerge, then the action is attributed to others, disturbing the sense of agency. This type of prediction error is agency-specific, called “agency error” in this paper. To clarify the neural basis of agency, recent neuroimaging studies have sought brain regions that process this agency error, and have proposed candidate areas, including the posterior parietal cortex (PPC), posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), supplementary motor area (SMA), insula, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and cerebellum (David et al., 2008 [Review]). A common method used in these studies is to induce agency error by altering the visual feedback that subjects receive as they control the movement of their own body (e.g., hand) or computer-graphic objects projected on the screen (e.g., virtual hand, cursor, cars) and to record the brain response to this violation of anticipated visuo-proprioceptive feedback (Leube et al., 2003a, Farrer et al., 2003a, David et al., 2007, Schnell et al., 2007).
However, when agency error was induced in previous studies, agency-irrelevant prediction errors were inevitably induced at the same time. Because previous studies have not dissociated brain responses to these errors from those to agency errors, some previous candidate regions might in fact process agency-irrelevant prediction errors. Such errors might take two forms. One is the inter-sensory matching error, which is not specific to visuo-proprioceptive conflict. When the visual feedback is distorted, as in tasks used in previous studies, violation of the predicted visuo-proprioceptive feedback association induces agency error. At the same time, however, it also evokes a more general inter-sensory matching error that is not specific to visuo-proprioceptive conflict and can be induced by any type of sensory mismatch, including audio–visual conflict. This modality-free inter-sensory matching error is irrelevant to agency, and we refer to this as “sensory matching error (SM error)” in this article. The other type of error involves the violation of prediction itself, irrespective of its content. This basic prediction error, described with terms like “oddball” or “mismatch negativity,” has been investigated using EEG (see Friedman et al., 2001, Picton et al., 2000 for a review). Here, we call this prediction error the “oddball error.”
In this study, we aimed to clarify which brain regions are specifically related to agency error by dissociating regions relating to agency error from regions relating to agency-irrelevant SM or oddball errors.
Section snippets
Subjects
Twenty-eight healthy right-handed volunteers with no significant psychiatric or neurological history were studied. Data from one subject were excluded due to head motion, and from three other subjects due to image artifacts. Thus, data from the remaining 24 subjects (mean age 21.04 years; range 18–24 years) are reported. Informed consent was obtained from all subjects prior to their participation. This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Graduate School of International
Behavioral data
Overall good performance in both the agency and SM error task and the oddball error task showed that subjects were concentrating on each task during scanning. In the agency and SM error task, accuracy for the target was 97.7 ± 1.5% (mean ± SD), and response time was 598.9 ± 87.5 ms (mean ± SD). Similarly, accuracy for the target response in the oddball error task was 97.8 ± 6.8% (mean ± SD), response time was 509.4 ± 62.9 ms (mean ± SD). No statistically significant difference was found between the accuracy
Discussion
In this experiment, we aimed to clarify which brain regions specifically relate to agency error by dissociating regions relating to agency error from those relating to agency-irrelevant SM or oddball errors. We found that agency error activated the SMA, the left lateral cerebellum, the right PPC, and the right EBA. From these results, we suggest that these regions play an important role in agency error processing and work as the neural basis of agency, the feeling of “self-causality” in action.
Acknowledgments
This study was supported by the JST/RISTEX, JST/CREST. Y.Y. was supported by a Grant-in-Aid for JSPS fellows (20 · 8136). M.S. was supported by KAKENHI (21119504).
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